This paper argues that self-reporting schemes whereby citizens report their noncompliance with regulation can prevent corruption in administrations. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. Ocials verify compliance before granting permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without a self-reporting scheme, the government tolerates bribery in order to deter extortion. In the presence of a self-reporting scheme, the government is able to deter both bribery and extortion by rewarding the ocials whose associated entrepreneurs self-report. In an extension, we incorporate intermediaries, and show their presence makes the self-reporting scheme more valuable.
Introduction
Petty corruption is widespread in the developing world and aects primarily the lowest levels of government, dealing with ordinary citizens and rms (e.g., tax collectors, environmental, and labor inspectors).
1 One of its consequences is to undermine the enforcement of regulations designed to protect society from risks and hazards (e.g., pollution, accidents, etc.).
A diculty in the struggle against corruption is to provide low-ranking ocials with the incentives to adequately perform their duty. Two issues, particularly salient in developing countries, give rise to this challenge. First, public ocials often have large discretionary power: little transparency surrounds the decisions they make. Second, ocials are rarely held accountable (e.g., because the judicial system is weak, or because supervisors are corrupt). As previous literature has emphasized, given such diculties, even benevolent governments may have no choice but to tolerate corruption (see, e.g., Finan et al. (2015) and Khalil et al. (2010) ).
To overcome these limitations, governments increasingly gather information from citizens at the receiving end of public services. In particular, a number of countries have recently implemented feedback schemes whereby users of public services can le complaints about government ocials.
2,3
In this paper, we argue in favor of a dierent but complementary approach to gathering information.
Specically, we make the case that communicating with citizens about their own behavior can also help in the ght against corruption. We show that allowing individuals or companies to report their failure to comply with rules (i.e., allowing them to self-report) and tying government ocial's pay to these reports can prevent corruption in public administrations. A virtue of our self-reporting scheme is its simplicity: neither does it require the intervention of monitors or courts, nor does the government need to verify the accuracy of the reports. We develop a model in which a population of entrepreneurs is required to comply with some regulation (e.g., environmental law) upon undertaking an activity (e.g., the production of a good). 3 See Amegashie (forthcoming) on whether complaints can discipline ocials. Mookherjee and Png (1992) consider complaints in a model without bribery. Prendergast (2003) looks at complaints as a means of bureaucratic oversight.
By deterring corruption, the scheme we propose makes regulation more eective in curbing negative externalities. Nevertheless, adopting this mechanism is not always socially optimal. Because it entails the payment of bonuses to ocials, the budget needed to maintain the administration is expanded. As a result, we nd that, for the adoption of the self-reporting scheme to be optimal, the cost of allocating the necessary resources must be relatively small compared to the external costs society can avoid by taming corruption.
The citizen feedback programs recently developed in several countries, such as Punjab's Feedback
Model, inspire the mechanism we propose.
5 However, in such programs, feedback is collected with the primary goals of guiding investigations against dishonest ocials and administering sanctions.
We explore a dierent, and possibly complementary, use of citizen-provided information. A novelty of our proposal is to empower citizens with the ability to directly inuence the pay of the ocials they interact with. By exploiting citizen reports, the government is able to oer ocials a highpowered incentive scheme that does not invite extortion. This feature of our scheme is particularly relevant, given that the lack of transparency regarding the ocials' decisions often hampers the implementation of eective anti-corruption incentives (OECD (2013, p. 110), Finan et (2015) ).
6
An additional practical concern is that incentive systems may be ineective if they provide broad discretion to higher-level supervisors (e.g., by requiring them to assess citizen reports). However, one strength of our scheme is precisely that ascertaining the accuracy of citizen reports is not necessary, so that the administrators in charge of implementing it are left with little discretion to exercise.
Finally, because of their limited informational content, citizen reports can consist of very simple and inexpensive actions (e.g., making or receiving a phone call, or sending an SMS).
In the second part of the paper, we introduce bureaucracy intermediaries (e.g, paralegals, brokers, facilitators, etc.). Intermediaries specialize in assisting individuals who must deal with administrations stipulate bonuses tied to uncontested tickets. Furthermore, oenders who agree to settle early (thereby admitting their fault) are often entitled to discounts on nes (http://www.economist.com/node/16847086/print, retrieved June 2015).
5 These schemes could be adapted to also incorporate the properties of our mechanism. For instance, in schemes in which citizens can le complaints about ocials, the government could introduce the possibility of waivinh the right to le a complaint in exchange for a compensation. In the logic of our model, waiving this right would be tantamount to acknowledging noncompliance.
6 Several scholars have argued in favor of linking ocials' rewards to their performance (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell (2000) ). The existing empirical evidence on the eectiveness of this kind of measures suggests they can be eective if carefully designed (Olken and Pande (2012) to obtain a government service (e.g., a permit), and are common in developing countries (Bertrand et al. (2007) , Fredriksson (2014) ). We focus on their ability to facilitate bribery: by developing stable relationships with ocials, intermediaries guarantee a preferential treatment for their customers, thereby weakening the incentives entrepreneurs have to comply with regulation. Our results suggest the pervasiveness of intermediaries is a by-product of the low-powered incentives provided to ocials.
We also show that, if properly exploited, the self-reporting scheme may allow the government to deter ocials from dealing with intermediaries, thereby strengthening the enforcement of regulation.
Related Literature. A vast literature exists on corruption in administrations (see, e.g., Aidt 7 A common nding is that a tension exists when trying to induce ocials to enforce rules and, at the same time, prevent them from abusing their discretionary power (e.g., Hindriks et al. (1999) , Polinsky and Shavell (2000) , Khalil et al. (2010) ). This tension can be so strong that tolerating some forms of corruption in order to deter others is optimal. Our contribution is to show how the government can deter all forms of corruption if it communicates appropriately with citizens.
Our model is thus related to a strand of the literature that investigates the scope for schemes in which individuals can report having paid or accepted a bribe. For instance, Bucirossi and Spagnolo 8 Contrary to these models, our focus is on the reporting by citizens of their choice of whether to comply with rules, and on how to formally incorporate such reports into public ocials' incentive pay. In addition, in our model, corruption is explicitly embedded in a regulatory framework. More generally, self-reporting schemes have been extensively studied in the law enforcement and cartel literatures (see, e.g., Innes (1990) , Kaplow and Shavell (1994) , Motta and Polo (2003) , Spagnolo (2005) , and Harrington (2008) Fredriksson (2014) , and Dusha (2015) . Our work departs from these by considering citizen-provided reports to the government.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves the game by rst assuming the government does not rely on entrepreneur reports, and then allowing for it. Section 4 presents an extension with bureaucracy intermediaries. Section 5 concludes.
Proofs of all propositions and lemmas are relegated to the Appendix. Proofs of additional results and extensions can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.
The Setup
We consider a government and a continuum of pairs of entrepreneurs and ocials of size 1.
Entrepreneurs wish to engage in an activity that generates a private benet G. The activity is socially risky in that it imposes damages D > G onto third parties (e.g., pollution) unless entrepreneurs comply with some regulation.
10 If the government allows the activity, it requests that all entrepreneurs comply with regulation and hires ocials to verify compliance. Upon verication, ocials decide whether to grant the permit necessary to undertake the activity, possibly in exchange for a bribe. 11 10 We model the decision to comply to capture the distinct consequences of bribery and extortion on welfare.
11 We refer to citizens as entrepreneurs, but our analysis is more general. It applies, for instance, to the issuance of driver's licenses, for which abundant evidence of corruption exists (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2007) . We provide further examples in Section 5.
Actions and Information. Each entrepreneur decides whether to apply for the permit. Applying is costless, but entrepreneurs apply only if their expected payo is strictly positive. Entrepreneurs unobservably choose whether to comply (e = h) or not comply (e = l) with regulation. An entrepreneur imposes damages D on third parties if she has chosen not to comply and yet is granted the permit. In case of damages, the government is unable to infer which entrepreneur is liable.
Choosing e = h implies a cost ψ to entrepreneurs, where ψ is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs according to the cumulative distribution function H (·) with support 0,ψ . The cost ψ is private information to the entrepreneurs and must be sustained regardless of whether the permit is granted.
Each entrepreneur (she) is randomly paired with an ocial (he). Within each pair, the ocial and entrepreneur observe a signal σ correlated with the latter's compliance choice e ∈ {l, h}. Specically, σ can take two values: either σ = c (compliance) or σ = n (non-compliance). We assume σ = c with probability 1 if e = h, and with probability 1 − ρ if instead e = l. Thus, σ = n with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) when e = l. The signal σ is observable only to the given ocial-entrepreneur pair, and having a third party verify it is exceedingly costly. The assumption that σ is observable to the entrepreneur best ts situations in which little margin exists for interpretation regarding compliance.
12 It also avoids unnecessary complications by ensuring bargaining between ocials and entrepreneurs takes place under symmetric information.
Within each pair, after having observed σ, and leaving aside the issue of corruption for the moment, the ocial rules whether to grant (r = g) or deny (r = d) the permit. We assume entrepreneurs are able to undertake the activity only if in possession of the permit.
13 Ocials' decisions regarding whether to grant the permit are observable to the government.
If ocials were perfectly obedient, and the government wished to allow the activity, instructing ocials to grant permits when σ = c and deny them when σ = n would maximize the expected level of social welfare (see below for the denition of welfare).
14 However, the government must rely on 12 An example is the regulation of truck weight (Olken and Barron (2009)). A threshold exists, known to both ocials and drivers, above which a truck is considered overweight. If the driver knows the amount of cargo on the truck, he is also aware the ocial observes noncompliance when the truck is weighed.
13 In practice, entrepreneurs may be able to do business without permits (e.g., by operating in the informal sector).
Our results are robust to this modication, as long as the gain obtained without a permit is (weakly) smaller than G, and as long as the expected harm imposed on society is not excessively larger than D.
14 Systematically denying permits would lead to no entrepreneur applying, and thus no economic activity.
Systematically granting permits would lead to no entrepreneur opting for compliance, which is undesirable, because D > G. Finally, choosing r = g when σ = n and r = d when σ = c would also lead to no entrepreneur opting to comply. ocials who enjoy full discretionary power and can choose r ∈ {g, d} independently of σ. We assume ocials face an expected sanction γ when either (i) r = d even though σ = c, (ii) r = g even though σ = n, or (iii) the ocial pockets a bribe. This (exogenous) sanction can have several interpretations, such as an expected penalty imposed by some monitor or a moral cost of dishonesty. To capture the fact that ocials operate in an environment of low accountability, we assume this sanction is small;
. As we argue below, when γ > G 2
, the government can deter all forms of corruption even in the absence of the self-reporting scheme.
Self-reporting Scheme. In an attempt to discourage corruption, the government may wish to implement a self-reporting scheme. Specically, after an ocial's review of the application (i.e., after σ is realized), but before the ruling r is led, an entrepreneur can either acknowledge/report her noncompliance to the government (i.e., send a message m = a) or remain silent (m = ∅). 
entrepreneur is issued a permit after having paid a bribe despite a high level of eort. V (n, g, ∅, b) = s g − γ + b if an ocial collects a bribe b from the entrepreneur he is paired with, and (unduly) grants her a permit after having observed σ = n.
Finally, the government chooses the schedule of wages {s g , s d, , s a } and the transfer t to maximize the expected level of social welfare, which is equal to the sum of all entrepreneur and ocials' expected payos, minus the expected level of damages and the expected wage bill. Moreover, we assume a cost λ ≥ 1 to society of making transfers to ocials (the cost of public funds). Finally, the government always has the option of banning the activity, in which case welfare is equal to zero.
Throughout, we assume G ≤ψ < D. In words, requesting that, upon undertaking the activity, entrepreneurs comply with regulation is socially optimal. However, undertaking the activity when requested to comply with regulation may not be socially (and privately) optimal.
Corruption. Because corruption involves agreements that are illicit, no straightforward approach to modelling it exists. In this paper, we suppose each ocial, after having observed σ, possibly makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the entrepreneur that species a ruling r, a message m, and a bribe b, to be paid as soon as the deal is struck. We assume the entrepreneur cannot commit to the message m specied in the deal, and thus require that it be chosen in a sequentially rational way. Furthermore, we assume the ocial, when designing the deal, cannot commit to a ruling r that occurs out-ofequilibrium. In other words, should the entrepreneur deviate from the message specied in the deal, the ocial chooses r in a sequentially rational way. 17
We assume ocials have full bargaining power when oering deals to entrepreneurs. This assumption is consistent with situations in which citizens have little protection vis-à-vis ocials.
18
An entrepreneur accepts a deal if and only if the payo it guarantees her is higher than her payo when she rejects the deal, in which case both players play in a sequentially rational way.
Anticipating the analysis to come, the only deal an entrepreneur and an ocial may enter involves 17 These assumptions simplify the exposition of the results because they limit the set of agreements ocials and entrepreneurs can enter. However, assuming they can enter complete contracts that specify transfers and actions contingent on all possible scenarios leads to identical results. A previous version of this paper in which this alternative contractual assumption is made is available upon request.
18 Our main results do not depend on this allocation of bargaining power. A more general treatment, in which we let the bargaining outcome within each ocial-entrepreneur pair be determined by the Nash Bargaining solution concept, is presented in the Supplementary Appendix.
granting the permit in exchange for a bribe. Formally, after observing σ, an ocial solves
and subject to the entrepreneur being better o not self-reporting.
Notationally, U σ ≡ U ψ, e, r σ , m σ , 0 , where r σ and m σ denote, respectively, the ocial's ruling and the message the enterepreneur sends in the absence of a deal, for a given σ.
We distinguish between bribery and extortion. Bribery occurs when an ocial obtains a payment from an entrepreneur found noncompliant (i.e., when σ = n) in return for the permit. Extortion occurs when an ocial obtains a payment from an entrepreneur found compliant (i.e., when σ = c)
in return for the permit.
Ocials can also abuse their power without engaging in corruption. Specically, to pocket as high a wage as possible, ocials may be tempted to make a decision r that contrasts with the signal observed. However, note that, because of the cost/sanction γ, ocials are better o not abusing their power when given at incentives, that is, when s g = s d .
Finally, we make the following assumptions. When an ocial does not make a deal, he makes the decision the government prefers when indierent between r = g and r = d. This assumption is unimportant because, as long as γ > 0, the government can always (at an arbitrarily small cost) break ocials' indierence and ensure a unique equilibrium. Similarly, we assume entrepreneurs accept a deal when payo-indierent between accepting or rejecting it. We make this assumption because an ocial can always break an entrepreneur's indierence at an arbitrarily small cost.
Timing. We summarize the model by presenting the timing of moves 19 :
1. The government decides whether to allow the activity. If the activity is allowed, the government chooses the schedule of wages {s g , s d , s a } and the transfer t.
2. The entrepreneurs simultaneously decide whether to apply for the permit. If an entrepreneur applies, she chooses her eort level e ∈ {l, h} and is paired with an ocial. If e = h, the 19 In the exposition of the timing, we anticipate the fact that the only deals ocials and entrepreneurs contemplate involve granting the permit in exchange for a bribe.
entrepreneur sustains the sunk cost ψ. For each pair, a signal σ ∈ {c, n} is realized.
3. Each entrepreneur-ocial pair possibly enters a deal. If a deal is struck, the entrepreneur pays a bribe b to the ocial. Subsequently, all entrepreneurs decide whether to self-report (m = a or m = ∅). All entrepreneurs who self-report are denied the permit and receive t.
4. For each entrepreneur who did not self-report, the ocial either grants (r = g) or denies (r = d) the permit; the government then pays salaries and payos are realized.
Solving the Model
We rst consider the case of no corruption. Next, we introduce corruption, and characterize the optimal wage schedule in both the absence and presence of the self-reporting scheme.
Uncorruptible Government Ocials
Suppose ocials never enter deals with entrepreneurs. Not communicating with entrepreneurs and setting all wages to zero ensures ocials choose r = g when σ = c and r = d when σ = n. As a result, a given entrepreneur intent on applying for the permit complies with regulation if and only if G − ψ ≥ (1 − ρ) G, which simplies to ψ ≤ ρG. The gross benet of complying is equal to ρG, that is, the increase in the probability that the ocial observes σ = c multiplied by the value of the permit.
Because max [G − ψ, (1 − ρ) G] > 0 for ∀ψ, all entrepreneurs apply for the permit but only a fraction H (ρG) of them choose to comply. Therefore, if the activity is allowed, the expected level of social welfarehereafter the no-corruption level of welfareis equal to
Ocials fail to deny the permit to all entrepreneurs who chose e = l. It follows that the expected level of damages is positive and equal to (1 − ρ) (1 − H (ρG)) D. As a consequence, social welfare is nonnegative if and only if
. Bribery. Consider an ocial whose signal indicates non-compliance (i.e., σ = n). Ignoring possible bribes, if the ocial denies the permit, his payo is equal to s d and the entrepreneur's is equal to 0.
By contrast, if the ocial unduly grants the permit, his payo is equal to s g −γ and the entrepreneur's is equal to G. The pair is thus better o choosing r = g if
Suppose this inequality holds. If, moreover, s g − γ > s d , the ocial chooses r = g without exchanging money: the entrepreneur would reject any request for a bribe, anticipating that granting the permit is in the ocial's interest. By contrast, if s g − γ ≤ s d , the wage s d is high enough that, absent a bribe, denying the permit is in the ocial's interest. As a result, and because the ocial has full bargaining power, he is able to extract a bribe equal to G.
Finally, if s d ≥ s g − γ + G, no bribe exists that the entrepreneur is willing to pay and that would lead to the ocial choosing r = g. Therefore, for the government to ensure permits are denied when σ = n, it must necessarily set
Because G − γ > 0, for the government to deter bribery, it must necessarily reward ocials who make decisions unfavorable to the entrepreneurs.
Extortion or Framing. Consider now an ocial whose signal indicates compliance (i.e., σ = c). 
there does not exist a bribe that the entrepreneur is willing to pay and would lead to the ocial choosing r = g. The ocial frames the entrepreneur by choosing r = d.
Summing up, for the government to ensure that ocials grant permits without engaging in extortion, it must necessarily set
Note that, to deter extortion, setting s g = s d is sucient; that is, making the ocials' wages unresponsive to their decisions is sucient.
Rearranging (3) and (4) leads to the following chain of inequalities:
To prevent bribery, the government must reward ocials who deny permits by setting s d suciently high. However, doing so means systematically denying permits in the ocials' best interest, thereby paving the way to either extortion or framing. Because of the ocials' low accountability, the government is unable to deter all forms of corruption, and must choose between bribery and extortion.
20
To establish which corrupt behavior should be deterred, let us briey comment on the distinct consequences on the entrepreneurs' incentives of having either (3) or (4) hold. Suppose (3) holds.
Ocials deny permits when σ = n, but either frame or extort entrepreneurs when σ = c. Because ocials who engage in extortion are able to extract the entire value of a permit, the entrepreneurs' gross payo is equal to zero both in case σ = c and σ = n, and applying for the permit is of no value.
As a result, social welfare is equal to zero.
21
Now suppose (4) holds. Ocials grant permits without extracting bribes when σ = c. By contrast, because (3) does not hold, ocials grant permits in exchange for bribes equal to G when σ = n. An 20 In case
≤ γ, the government can deter both bribery and extortion by setting wages appropriately.
In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that extortion continues to have a more detrimental consequence on welfare than bribery, unless entrepreneurs enjoy particularly high bargaining power.
entrepreneur intent on applying thus complies with regulation if and only if
which simplies to ψ ≤ ρG. Because max [G − ψ, (1 − ρ) G] > 0 for ∀ψ, all entrepreneurs apply for the permit, but only a fraction H(ρG) chooses to comply with regulation. Specically, those who comply do so because their cost of compliance ψ is smaller than the expected bribe ρG they would pay to obtain the permit if they chose e = l. For the remaining entrepreneurs, ψ is large enough that not complying, and running the risk of having to pay the bribe if detected, is rational. Given that bribery is not deterred, all entrepreneurs who choose not to comply obtain the permit.
The next proposition states the government's optimal policy in the absence of the self-reporting
Proposition 1. Suppose the government does not implement the self-reporting scheme. If D ≤ D N S 0 , allowing the activity and tolerating bribery so as to prevent extortion is optimal. The optimal ocials' wages are s g = 0 and s d ∈ [0, γ], and the associated level of social welfare is equal to
If D > D N S 0 , banning the activity is optimal.
If the government allows the activity, it must tolerate either bribery or extortion. However, the above discussion show clearly that tolerating extortion can never be a viable option. If bribery is tolerated, making the ocials' wages unresponsive to their decisions (see (4)) is then sucient, and the government may as well set s d = s g = 0. It follows that tolerating bribery minimizes the wage bill. Moreover, bribery has a disciplining eect on entrepreneurs. Because those who are detected as noncompliant enjoy a lower payo than those who are not, many entrepreneurs choose to comply with regulation. The key social cost of allowing bribery is therefore that entrepreneurs who choose not to complyand obtain the permit via briberyimpose damages D onto third parties.
Comparing the achieved level of welfare in (6) to the no-corruption one in (2) is instructive.
Although, in both cases, (i) the expected wage bill is zero and (ii) the measure of compliant entrepreneurs is identical (see (5)), welfare when bribery is tolerated is lower than in the nocorruption benchmark. As a result, corruption reduces the threshold on the level of damages D above which the government prefers to ban the activity (i.e., D N S
Introducing the Self-Reporting Scheme
Now suppose the government implements the self-reporting scheme. Specically, the government denies the permit to all entrepreneurs who acknowledge their noncompliance while compensating them with a transfer t. Furthermore, the government designs the schedule of wages {s g , s d , s d }. As we now show, this scheme makes deterring both extortion and bribery possible.
To gain intuition, we revisit the incentives ocials have to engage in corruption. Consider extortion rst, and recall that, to deter it, the government must set wages in such a way that the threat of framing is not credible. Assume an ocial and an entrepreneur have not entered into a deal. If the entrepreneur chose not to self-report (i.e., m = ∅), choosing r = g when σ = c is in the ocial's best interest if and only if
Now consider bribery. If the entrepreneur chose m = ∅, when σ = n, an ocial prefers to deny the permit rather than take a bribe if and only if
where the right-hand side of (8) represents the ocial's payo in case of bribery.
As shown in the previous section, satisfying both (7) and (8) is impossible. However, the government can now exploit the wage s a to prevent bribery. To see this, suppose s a = G − t − γ and
In words, the government rewards the ocials whose entrepreneurs self-report. Because s g = s d , extortion is deterred: it is enough for the compliant entrepreneur not to self-report to make it subsequently rational for her ocial to grant the permit. By contrast, when σ = n, entrepreneurs who did not enter a deal with their ocial are denied the permit regardless of whether they self-report.
Hence, they prefer to self-report and obtain the compensation t. We summarize these ndings in the following Lemma (the conditions under which the scheme is socially optimal are stated in Proposition 2).
Lemma 1. The government can deter both bribery and extortion by implementing a self-reporting scheme such that 1. a transfer t (arbitrarily small) is promised to the entrepreneurs who self-report, and 2. ocials' wages are such that
The value of an entrepreneur's report does not lie in its informational content, but in how it aects incentives. On the one hand, entrepreneurs found compliant never self-report. Thus, extortion is deterred, because the ocials' pay is then at. On the other hand, ocials know entrepreneurs found noncompliant are better o self-reporting, and thus prefer to pocket the extra wage rather than engage in bribery. The scheme we propose resembles institutional arrangements featured in many regulatory systems. Schemes whereby individuals acknowledge noncompliance to qualify for a compensation are common. For instance, in trac law enforcement, several countries (e.g., France, Italy, and the UK) allow drivers who are issued nes to receive discounts if they acknowledge their wrongdoing.
Furthermore, enforcers' wages are often tied to uncontested tickets. Our contribution is to show how these schemes can help in the ght against corruption.
We believe a virtue of our self-reporting scheme is its simplicity, primarily because it does not require the government to assess the reports. As a result, these reports can consist of very simple (and inexpensive) actions, such as making (or receiveing) a phone call or sending text messages from mobile phones.
25 In addition, because the mechanism disciplines ocials simply by conditioning their unsuccesful applicants wishing to apply again could become eligible to have the process expedited, be exempt from future application fees, and so on.
23 Specically, an ocial could get a bribe equal to G minus the entrepeneur's payo when not entering a deal, namely t. In an extension, available in the Supplementary Appendix, we show that if the size of bribes is limited by budgetary constraints for the entrepreneur, so is the level that sa needs to attain in order to deter bribery. Our main results are qualitatively unaected.
24 Even if ocials and entrepreneurs could agree on playing r = d and m = a (which is not feasible, because r = d
is not sequentially rational when σ = c), they would not make such a deal, because sa − γ < G + sg; that is, ocials could not compensate the entrepreneurs for forgoing the permit. Before proceeding, discussing two features of our scheme seems worthwile. First, we assumed the entrepreneurs cannot commit to their message m while interacting with their ocial. Noncompliant applicants may otherwise be inclined to commit not to self-report, to make bribery tempting to the ocials. Ensuring the entrepreneurs cannot commit not to self-report seems easily achievable. For instance, the scheme can be designed such that the entrepreneurs have the possibility of self-reporting only after a certain amount of time has elasped since the end of their interaction with the ocial.
Second, we have also assumed the entrepreneurs can self-report only prior to their ocials' decision regarding whether to grant the permit. This assumption implies that the ocial cannot abuse the scheme by committing to deny the permit.
26 This outcome can be avoided by ensuring the ocials le their nal decision only once the interaction with the entrepreneurs has ended, and the latter has decided whether to self-report. However, the condition whereby the ocials' ruling takes place after the entrepreneurs' report is not crucial for the mechanism to be viable. For example, assume the ocials can deny the permit before the entrepreneurs decide whether to self-report. Suppose further that a compliant entrepreneur suers some disutility when self-reporting (e.g., a cost of being treated unfairly). If the transfer t is chosen to be smaller than this disutility, only entrepreneurs found noncompliant self-report when denied the permit and, as a result, extortion is deterred.
Welfare analysis. We now analyze the conditions under which the scheme described in Lemma 1
Proposition 2. Suppose the cost of public funds is such that 1 ≤ λ <
, not implementing the self-reporting scheme, and tolerating bribery so as to prevent extortion by setting s g = s d = 0, is optimal.
2. When D F < D ≤ D S 0 , implementing the self-reporting scheme stated in Lemma 1 is optimal. 3. When D > D S 0 , banning the activity is optimal.
26 Such a threat, if credible, would make self-reporting rational for compliant entrepreneurs.
G−γ , not implementing the self-reporting scheme, and tolerating bribery so as to prevent extortion by setting s g = s d = 0, is optimal if and only if D < D N S 0 . Otherwise, banning the activity is optimal.
A review of the advantages and drawbacks of the self-reporting scheme is useful. First, it allows the government to deter not only extortion, but also bribery. As a result, no entrepreneur found ineligible obtains the permit. Also, by setting t small, the government provides incentives to comply with regulation virtually as strong as in the no-corruption benchmark, because an entrepreneur's payo is equal to G when σ = c and to t when σ = n. 27 Thus, the expected level of gains and damages the activity generates is identical to that when corruption is infeasible. The drawback is that the government must promise a positive wage s a , which increases the government's wage bill.
When the self-reporting scheme is implemented, social welfare is equal to
Because of the additional wage bill, the cost λ cannot be excessively high for the scheme to be optimal. We nd that if λ ≤ 
Bureaucracy Intermediaries
We have so far assumed ocials and entrepreneurs interact directly. We now extend the model to consider indirect interaction through intermediaries (e.g., paralegals, brokers, facilitators, etc.). This 28 To show that On the one hand, they reduce the transaction costs of dealing with the administration. On the other hand, intermediaries also facilitate corruption; by developing relationships with ocials, they guarantee a preferential treatment to their customers. Because our interest is in the interplay between corruption and intermediaries, we ignore the cost-saving aspect of the services they provide.
We rst show the pervasiveness of intermediaries is related to the low-powered incentives provided to ocials. Without the self-reporting scheme, the optimal wage schedule is such that ocials collect bribes via intermediaries when entrepreneurs' willingness to pay for the permit is large enough. Next, we show that the self-reporting scheme can reduce the extent of intermediated corruption.
Modied setup. The action space of the entrepreneurs is expanded to allow them to acquire the permit via an intermediary. Specically, e = {h, l, i}, where i denotes using an intermediary. An intermediary guarantees a permit by means of his connection with the ocial. Hence, if e = i, the ocial always chooses r = g. Obtaining the permit via the intermediary does not require any compliance eort on the entrepreneur's part. However, a fee ϕ has to be paid for the intermediary's service. In turn, the intermediary pays a price p to the ocial. In other words, the ocial sells the permit to the intermediary, who then re-sells it to the entrepreneur. For simplicity, intermediaries sustain no costs (except for the money paid to the ocial) and make no prots (e.g., because of free entry). As a result, ϕ = p in equilibrium; relaxing these assumptions would slightly complicate the analysis without altering the results.
One of the reasons intermediaries enjoy preferential access to ocials is that they develop longterm relationships. Such relationships require trust and commitment not to renege on agreements.
Accordingly, we assume each ocial can commit to p before entrepreneurs choose e. By contrast, ocials cannot commit to the bribes they request when interacting with entrepreneurs directlythe relationship between ocials and entrepreneurs being one shot. Hence, if e = {h, l} are chosen, the game continues as in our basic setup. We assume that if an entrepreneur has chosen to deal with the ocial directly, she cannot revise her decision at a later stage. We also assume that when an entrepreneur is indierent between e = i and e = l, she chooses e = i.
Whether a permit has been issued by means of an intermediary is unobservable. To facilitate comparison with previous results, we maintain the assumption that entrepreneurs are matched exogenously with ocials and, consequently, with (one of ) the intermediaries with whom the ocial regularly deals (we assume the set of intermediaries associated with each ocial is exogenous). Finally, to streamline exposition, we assume ψ ∼ U 0,ψ . Also, we suppose D is never so large that the government cannot do better than to ban the activity.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The government chooses the ocials' wage schedule {s g , s d , s a } and the transfer t for the entrepreneurs who self-report.
2. Each ocial sets p, and intermediaries set ϕ = p.
3. Each entrepreneur is paired with an ocial and an intermediary, and chooses e = {h, l, i}. 
To save on notation, we drop the arguments other than e in U (·). A measure H(ψ) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, and the remainder choose either e = l or e = i. 29 Ocials' incentives. For notational convenience, we write V (σ) as shorthand for V (σ, r, s, b).
Assume an entrepreneur deals directly with her ocial, that is, e = {h, l}. The ocial's interim 29 To simplify exposition, we assume all entrepreneurs apply for the permit. This assumption is without loss of generality. As in the baseline model, tolerating extortion is never optimal. As a result, the expected payo of an entrepreneur who does not comply with regulation but applies for the permit (without going through an intermediary) is strictly positive (because σ = c with probabiliy 1 − ρ when e = h). payo (i.e., before the realization of σ) is then V (c) if the entrepreneur chooses e = h, and ρV (n) + (1 − ρ) V (c) if the entrepreneur chooses e = l. Now assume the entrepreneur chooses e = i.
The ocial with whom she is paired pockets p from the intermediary, the salary s g , and incurs the cost γ. Hence, the ocial's payo is s g + p − γ. We assume an ocial maximizes his expected payo when choosing p (anticipating the probability that the entrepreneur he will be paired with chooses compliance, i.e., H(ψ)).
No self-reporting scheme. Ocials who grant the permit receive s g , and those who deny it receive s d . Consider the direct interaction between an ocial and an entrepreneur. The game the two parties play is identical to that in the baseline model. Hence, (3) has to hold to deter bribery, whereas (4) has to hold to deter extortion (see Section 3.2). The two conditions cannot hold jointly, and the optimal incentive scheme has to be such that (4) holds.
30 Therefore, we have b c = 0, b n = G, and r = g for ∀σ. In words, permits are always granted, but a bribe equal to G is paid when noncompliance is detected (i.e., with probability ρ). LetG be a threshold on the private benet G (see the Appendix). Proposition 3. If no self-reporting scheme is implemented, the optimal wage schedule is s g = 0 and
• If G ≤G, ocials do not deal with intermediaries. The equilibrium is identical to that described in Proposition 1.
• If G >G, all noncompliant entrepreneurs obtain the permit via an intermediary at p =ψ +γ 2 . The share of noncompliant entrepreneurs is strictly larger than if intermediaries were unavailable.
In this model, ocials collect bribes from intermediaries if and only if the entrepreneurs' willingness to pay for the permit G is large enough. To grasp the intuition, consider that p is bounded from above by ρG, that is, the expected bribe an entrepreneur who does not comply with regulation pays when choosing to bypass the intermediary. As a result, when G is small enough, an ocial who sells permits to intermediaries cannot do better than to set p = ρG. But, intuitively, when setting this price, the ocial's expected revenue would be the same as when taking bribes directly. Thus, the 30 We provide an informal argument. Suppose the government did not deter extortion. Any entrepreneur complying with regulation would have to pay a bribe b = G to obtain the permit. Hence, her payo would be nonpositive, implying that no entrepreneur would comply. Clearly, this outcome cannot be socially optimal.
ocial has no reason to deal with the intermediaries. However, when G is large enough, the ocial can set p below ρG and get a larger expected payo than when dealing with entrepreneurs directly.
The ocial thereby induces more entrepreneurs to pay bribes to get the permit, although p can be kept large enough to compensate the loss of revenue from inframarginal ones. Note that in a one-shot interaction with an entrepreneur, the ocial cannot commit to an expected bribe below ρG, even though attracting more customers is desirable.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is that intermediaries make noncompliance more pervasive when G >G (and do not aect it otherwise). Indeed, the price of an illegitimate permit is lower, and fewer entrepreneurs comply with regulation.
Corollary. Suppose the government does not implement a self-reporting scheme. Banning intermediaries would be socially desirable if and only if G >G.
In reality, cracking down on intermediaries is hard, for instance, because many operate informally.
Thus, the government has no choice but to provide ocials with strong enough incentives to refuse to sell permits via intermediaries. However, just like in our baseline model, the risk of opening the door to extortion makes this objective elusive.
Implementing a self-reporting scheme. We restrict attention to the case in which G >G, because we are interested in situations in which, in its absence, the equilibrium is such that ocials sell permits to intermediaries (see Proposition 3 above). Furthermore, we do not characterize the optimal incentive scheme. Rather, we establish the existence of a scheme that (i) makes deterring both extortion and bribery (direct as well indirect) possible, and (ii) increases social welfare. The mechanism we characterize is close in spirit to that of Lemma 1: ocials are rewarded only when The logic underpinning this scheme is identical to the baseline model. To fully deter bribery, however, the government also needs to make sure ocials do not sell permits through intermediaries. This requires raising s a up tos (observe that the optimal s d in absence of intermediaries, as stated in Proposition 2, is equal to G − t − γ, which is smaller thans). When the expected gain from catching noncompliant entrepreneurs is large enough, ocials prefer not to deal with intermediaries.
A straightforward implication is that the wage bill associated with the self-reporting scheme is higher than if intermediaries were absent. This is not surprising: intermediaries make sustaining bribery easier, and thus force the government to pay higher bonuses to deter it.
Conclusion
One of the most detrimental consequences of corruption is that it undermines regulations aiming to protect society from risks and hazards. In this paper, we have made the case for a simple self-reporting scheme that enables the government to deter all forms of corruption. We have also shown the presence of bureaucracy intermediaries can make the self-reporting scheme even more desirable.
We believe the scheme developed in this paper could be helpful in settings dierent from the one we have considered. A rst example is the collection of taxes and customs duties, where inspectors may be (2014)). Presumably, the scheme we propose could allow the government to deter corruption and increase compliance with weight requirements. When implementing the self-reporting scheme, the government could promise reduced sanctions to rms or drivers acknowledging their own noncompliance.
Finally, we also believe the mechanism we propose can be applied to tackle collusion and abuses of authority within rms. As previous literature has pointed out (see, e.g., Tirole (1992), Khalil et al. (2010)), supervisors frequently collude with, and harass, subordinates. Although the ultimate objective of a principal might be to maximize prot rather than social welfare, we believe the mechanism we propose can also help deter abuses by supervisors.
u σ , regardless of r and m. Recall also that, when no deal is struck, the payo of an entrepreneur is u σ by denition. It follows that if u c = u n , no entrepreneur chooses to comply, because her payo is independent of σ, and thus social welfare is bounded from above by zero.
Proof of Proposition 1
We rst describe the outcome of the subgame that takes place if the entrepreneur and ocial do not strike a deal. Next, we describe the conditions under which the two parties strike a deal, and the resulting outcome. Finally, we characterize the optimal wage schedule.
No deal
We rst compute r σ and u σ for ∀σ. In the absence of a deal, an ocial obtains
and zero otherwise. Therefore, if s d > s g + γ, then r σ = d for ∀σ, and thus u σ = 0 for ∀σ. If
then r σ = g for ∀σ, and thus u σ = G for ∀σ. Applying Lemma A.1, no loss of generality occurs in restricting our attention to schedules of wages satisfying s g + γ ≥ s d ≥ s g − γ. Thus, r c = g and r n = d, so that u c = G and u n = 0. Furthermore, V c = s g and V n = s d .
Deal
We now characterize the conditions under which an ocial strikes a deal with an entrepreneur.
Assume the deal entails the permit being granted, that is, r σ = g. To determine b c , the ocial and V (n, g, ∅, G), and using the fact that G > 2γ, one straightforwardly derives that the ocial never chooses the deals involving r = d. 
all entrepreneurs apply for the permit. Also, a fraction H (ρG) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, and the rest choose e = l. As argued above, the optimal incentive scheme must satisfy s g +γ ≥ s d ≥ s g −γ.
Therefore, the government chooses {s g , s d } to maximize 
Proof of Proposition 2
We rst describe the outcome of the subgame that takes place if the entrepreneur and ocial do not strike a deal. Next, we describe the conditions under which the two parties enter a deal, and the resulting outcome of the deal. Finally, we characterize the optimal wage schedule.
No deal
Consider a given pair and suppose no deal was struck.
We rst compute the ocial and entrepreneur's payos when the latter has chosen not to self-report (i.e., m σ = ∅). The ocial 
We now analyze the entrepreneur's choice whether to self-report (and forgo the permit). This choice is rational for the entrepreneur if and only if her payo in the ensuing subgame exceeds u ∅ σ .
We consider the three cases highlighted in the previous paragraph in turn. The rst is such that
Because u ∅ σ = G for ∀σ, the entrepreneur is better o not self-reporting. As a result, r σ = g, m σ = ∅, and u σ = G for ∀σ. Now suppose s d − γ > s g . Because u ∅ σ = 0 < t, the entrepreneur is better o self-reporting, ∀σ. As a result, m σ = a, and u σ = t, ∀σ. Finally, suppose
Because u ∅ c = G, the entrepreneur self-reports when σ = c. As a result, r c = g, m c = ∅, V c = s g , and u c = G. By contrast, because u ∅ n = 0 < t, the entrepreneur is better o self-reporting when σ = n. As a result, m n = a, V n = s a , and u n = t. Thus, the deal is not implementable. Assume the deal species m σ = a. Because (i) the ocial cannot commit to a ruling r, which here only occurs out-of-equilibrium (i.e., if the entrepreneur sends m = ∅), (ii) G > t, and (iii) the bribe b is sunk, the entrepreneur deviates if choosing r = g is then in the ocial's interest. Faced with a deviation, the ocial chooses r = g if and only if σ = c, because
As a result, a deal specifying m σ = a is viable only if σ = n. However, given that m n = a and u n = t, note the ocial's payo cannot be larger than V n = s a when implementing this deal. The ocial is thus better o not oering this deal when σ = n.
It follows that, given σ, if a deal is struck, it must entail r σ = g and m σ = ∅. To determine b c , the ocial maximizes s g − γ + b c subject to G − b c ≥ u c = G, which yields b c = 0. To determine b n , the ocial maximizes s g − γ + b n subject to G − b n ≥ u n = t, which yields b n = G − t. As a result,
Comparing these payos to V c = s g and V n = s a , we nd the ocial is payo-indierent regarding whether to oer a deal when σ = c. Thus, no deal is struck and r c = g and b c = 0. Further, when σ = n, the ocial oers a deal if and only if s g − γ + G − t > s a . As a result, r n = g, m n = ∅, and b n = G − t if s g − γ + G − t > s a , whereas m n = a and b n = 0 otherwise.
Ocials' Optimal Schedule of Wages
We now determine the optimal wage schedule {s g , s a , s d , t}. We know the optimal schedule of wages is such that
Moreover, we must distinguish between two cases, depending on whether s g − γ + G − t > s a holds. For each of these two cases, we characterize the associated expression for social welfare, and the (locally) optimal schedule of wages. We then compare welfare levels to determine the globally optimal scheme.
Assume s g − γ + G − t > s a . An entrepreneur intent on applying chooses e = h if and 
Setting s g = 0, s a ∈ [0, G − γ − t), and s d ∈ [0, γ] is optimal because doing so achieves the highest possible value of (12) while satisfying all constraints. Observe also that (12) is decreasing in t, so that setting t arbitrarily close to 0 is optimal. Social welfare is then made arbitrarily close to
Assume now s g − γ + G − t ≤ s a . An entrepreneur intent on applying chooses e = h if
all entrepreneurs apply for the permit. Also, a fraction H (ρ (G − t)) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, and the rest choose e = l. Note, however, that unlike when s g − γ + G − t > s a , the entrepreneurs for which σ = n is realized do not obtain the permit. The government chooses {s g , s a , s d , t} to maximizê
Notice (14) is decreasing in s g and s a . Also, from (15) and (16), s a is bounded from below by 
Observe that (17) 
Socially optimal incentive scheme
The last step involves comparing welfare levels. Welfare level (17) is strictly higher than (13) if and only if D > D S ≡ λ (G − γ). Therefore, this condition must hold for the scheme to be optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 3
An ocial chooses p to maximize his expected payo, computed using H(ψ). Assume noncompliant entrepreneurs use intermediaries. Then, an ocial's expected payo is By contrast, with probability 1 − H(ψ), the entrepreneur chooses e = i, which results in an expected payo equal to s g + p − γ. Note that, under our assumptions, p does not aect the size of the pool of potential applicants for an ocial, but only their compliance eort e. Now assume U (i) < U (l). An ocial's expected payo is then equal to
In the expression, s rn and b n denote, respectively, the wage and the bribe when σ = n, and l(n, r, b n ) is an indicator function equal to 1 if r = g and/or b n > 0, and 0 otherwise. With probability H(ψ) (resp. 1 − H(ψ) ), an ocial is paired with an entrepreneur who chose e = h (e = l).
In Section 4.1, we argued that tolerating bribery so as to deter extortion is optimal. Recall also that we anticipate, without loss of generality, that all entrepreneurs apply for the permit. Because b c = 0, b n = G, and r = g for ∀σ, an entrepreneur chooses e = h if and only if
In (18), the right-hand side is the maximum between the expected payo an entrepreneur enjoys when e = l and that when e = i. Because extortion is ruled out, an entrepreneur who complies obtains the permit with probability 1. Those who do not comply either bribe ocials (when detected) or acquire the permit through an intermediary. In the former case, the cost is the expected bribe ρG. In the latter, it is p. Hence, when p > ρG, all entrepreneurs who do not comply prefer to deal directly with ocials. When ρG ≥ p, they all prefer to deal with intermediaries. Hence,ψ = min (ρG, p). The fraction of entrepreneurs who comply with regulation is nondecreasing in p.
Now consider now the expected payo of a given ocial. This payo can be written as
When p > ρG, the entrepreneur with whom the ocial is paired does not use an intermediary.
Therefore, the ocial anticipates that the probability of dealing with a noncompliant entrepreneur is 1 − H(ρG), and that the expected bribe (net of the lying cost γ) is ρ (G − γ). When ρG ≥ p, the ocial knows the entrepreneur with whom he is paired uses an intermediary if noncompliant (i.e., all entrepreneurs for which ψ ≤ p choose e = h). Hence, the probability of dealing with an intermediary is 1 − H(p), and the payo is equal to p − γ. Finally, because bribery is tolerated, the ocial always grants the permit and pockets s g .
We maximize (19) with respect to p. For ∀p > ρG, that is, such that the ocial does not deal with intermediaries, the expected payo is V N I ≡ψ −ρḠ ψ · ρ (G − γ) . Otherwise, the objective function is . To see this, note that V I > V N I can be rewritten as 2ρG −ψ − γ 2 > 4γ (1 − ρ) ψ − ρG . The left-(resp. right-) hand side of the inequality is strictly increasing (decreasing) with G (conditional on G >ψ +γ 2ρ
). Hence,G >ψ +γ 2ρ
exists such that V I > V N I if and only if G >G. To explicitly writeG, one has to solve the equality V I = V N I for G. We forgo this excercise because it is unessential for our argument.
Summing up, the globally optimal p is such that p > ρG for G ≤G, and equal toψ +γ 2 otherwise.
Using (18) , it follows that when G ≤G, a fraction H(ρG) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, whereas the remainder choose e = l. By contrast, when G >G, a fraction H(ψ +γ 2 ) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, whereas the remainder choose e = i.
Proof of the Corollary to Proposition 3
Following Proposition 3, when G >G, welfare is equal to W =ˆψ 
We conclude that if G >G, (20) is strictly smaller than (21): welfare would be larger if intermediaries were banned. When G ≤G, welfare is the same as if intermediaries were banned.
Proof of Proposition 4
As stated in the text, we assume s a ≥ G − t − γ > s d = s g = 0 and t = > 0 and arbitrarily small. We proceed as follows. We rst characterize the equilibrium outcomes when an ocial and an entrepreneur interact directly. Next, we characterize the outcome when an entrepreneur decides to use an intermediary. Finally, we perform a welfare analysis.
Direct interaction between ocial and entrepreneur (e = h, l)
Consider a given pair, and assume no deal has been struck. Because of the conditions the incentive scheme satises by assumption, one can follow the same steps as in the Proof of Proposition 2 to prove the outcome of this subgame is r c = g, m c = ∅, and u c = G. Furthermore, m n = a and u n = t. In words, in the absence of a deal with the entrepreneur, the ocial grants the permit when σ = c. By contrast, when σ = n, the entrepreneur chooses to self-report and is denied the permit.
We now analyze the conditions under which the ocial strikes a deal with the entrepreneur.
Deals entailing r = d can be ruled out following the same steps as in the Proof of Proposition 2.
Furthermore, when σ = c and the ocial proposes a deal entailing r c = g and m c = ∅, no positive bribe exists that the entrepreneur would be willing to pay, because u c = G. Therefore, the ocial is better o not oering a deal and the entrepreneur (ocial) obtains G (s g = 0). Suppose now σ = n.
Because u n = t, the ocial may propose a bribe not larger than b n = G − t in exchange for r n = g. Therefore, because s a ≥ G − γ − t by assumption, the ocial is strictly better o not proposing any deal. As a result, we have m n = a. Hence, when σ = n, the entrepreneur (ocial) obtains t = (s a ).
Interaction with intermediary (e = i)
When interacting with an intermediary, an ocial grants the permit in exchange for p. The entrepreneur (ocial) obtains G − p (resp., p − γ).
Price setting by the ocial , and ρG < p otherwise.
Behavior of entrepreneurs and social welfare
If s a <s, so that p =ψ +γ 2
, a fraction H(ψ +γ 2 ) of entrepreneurs choose e = h, whereas the remainder choose e = i. If s a ≥s, so that ρG < p, a fraction H(ρG) of entrepreneurs choose e = h, whereas the remainder choose e = l and obtain the permit only if σ = c, that is, with probability 1 − ρ. Thus, conditional on s a <s, social welfare is equal to W =ˆψ
Now assume s a ≥s. Social welfare is equal to
Setting s a =s is clearly optimal. Hence,
Comparing (22) and (23), we conclude a threshold D I exists such that (22) 
